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1. Introduction
The dual objectives of this paper are to present two complementary inequality indices that
provide a more nuanced picture of how the distribution of income is changing across European
countries and to use the information that these indices provide to study the distributional
changes that can be attributed to the push for “austerity” across Europe in 2010. Following
Blyth (2013a, pp. 866-877), let us define austerity as cutting the state’s budget to stabilize
public finances, restore competitiveness through wage cuts, and create better investment
expectations by lowering future tax burdens. Austerity is not simply fiscal consolidation,
nor is it a static concept. Austerity is rooted in a dynamic conception of the economy as an
evolving object with its own inter-temporal budget constraint. The objective of austerity is to
inspire confidence amongst international investors that their investment will yield positive
returns. The signal provided by the large drop in government expenditure or increase in
taxes is traded for increased investment as a result of this increased confidence, generating
a so-called expansionary fiscal contraction.
As more and more attention is devoted to understanding how the size distribution of
income is related to policy and business cycle changes, it is important to track distributional
changes across the entire distribution. It is well-known, for example, that the most frequently
used summary measure, the Gini coefficient, is most sensitive to distributional changes near
the mode of the distribution and this understates increasing inequality due to changes in
the upper tail. The empirical work by Thomas Piketty and his many co-authors was path-
breaking exactly because their focus on top income shares highlighted distributional changes
that had gone largely unnoticed. More recently, Voitchovsky (2005) highlighted that it is “the
profile of inequality” – not just inequality per se – that matters for the future performance
of an economy.
The measures for inequality at the bottom and inequality at the top used in this paper
were proposed by Jantzen & Volpert (2012) (we will refer to them as the JV-indices from
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here on) and are based on a very parsimonious Lorenz curve model. Both in terms of
the data requirements and overall generality, our statistical approach for calculating these
measures has advantages over discrete approximations or the fitting of complex parametric
distributions. Yet together with an overall measure of inequality like the Gini, they provide
a complete and nuanced summary of how the distribution of income is changing.
With respect to the distributional impact of austerity across Europe, we provide an ex-
panded and more rigorous follow-up analysis to Schneider, Kinsella & Godin (2015). Specif-
ically, the calculation of the JV-indices from Eurostat SILC (Statistics of Income and Living
Conditions) data has been significantly refined while the number of countries for which we
estimate them has been expanded. Furthermore, we include separate measures for cyclically
adjusted spending and revenue from the OECD in addition to IMF estimates for changes in
the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Using this data, we look at the impact of changes to
a country’s fiscal stance on the distribution of income, paying special attention to whether
changes in public expenditures or revenues affect inequality at the bottom or top of the
distribution.
1.1. Austerity in Europe
The central idea that captured the imagination of European policy-makers was that debt-
ridden countries could not spend their way to prosperity. In the aftermath of the global
financial crisis of 2008, many European countries (especially at the periphery) saw deficits
sore and by 2010 there was a concerted push for “the deliberate deflation of domestic wages
and prices through cuts to public spending” (Blyth, 2013b) as well as increased revenue
through new taxes. Of course, the worsening fiscal position of countries like Spain had little
to do with excessive spending and a lot to do with capital flight from the periphery in the
aftermath of the financial crisis (see Zezza, 2012, Boyer, 2012). The contractionary effects
of spending cuts and tax increases were minimized in public discussion while the virtues for
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“business confidence” were highlighted. As so many have now pointed out, the “confidence
fairy” (Krugman, 2010) never showed and the economic multipliers associated with especially
spending cuts proved bigger than anticipated, resulting in the prolonged and still-ongoing
economic slump hobbling Europe (Zezza, 2012, Blyth, 2013b, Guajardo, Leigh & Pescatori,
2014).
While austerity tends to focus on cuts to the public sector and privatization, reductions
in the social safety net spending and reductions in worker security (especially via cuts to
pension programs, see Table 1), it also includes a push to raise revenue. Especially in the
peripheral countries, this included often regressive taxation via sales and excise taxes, VATs,
and property taxes (see Table 2). Ortiz & Cummins (2013) offer a systematic review of IMF
Country reports from the pre-crisis period through projections for 2016, providing further
specific detail regarding the adoption of austerity globally.
Table 1: Reforms to Expenditures by Country, 2009–2012
Country Public
Wage
Freeze/
Reduction
Control
Size of
Civil
Service
Savings
from
Pensions
Savings
from
Health
Care
Reduction
of Other
Social
Benefits
Reduction
in Public
Investment
France × × ×
Germany ×
Greece × × × × × ×
Ireland × × × × × ×
Italy × × × × × ×
Portugal × × × × × ×
Spain × × × × × ×
United
Kingdom
× × × × × ×
Source: Table 4 of International Monetary Fund (October 2012)
Some researchers suspect that the push for austerity really reflected an opportunistic salvo
for a neoliberal policy agenda (Peet, 2011, Bougrine, 2012, Zezza, 2012).2 Hence austerity
2Blyth (2013a) provides tacit push-back to the notion that the turn to austerity was purely opportunistic.
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Table 2: Reforms to Revenue Sources by Country, 2009–2012
Country Incr.
Pers.
Income
Tax
Incr.
Corp.
Income
Tax
Incr.
Capital
Gains
Tax
Incr.
Soc.
Sec.
Contr.
Incr.
VAT or
Sales
Tax
Incr.
Excise
Tax
Incr.
Prop.
Tax
Better
Tax
Compliance
France × × × × ×
Germany ×
Greece × × × × × ×
Ireland × × × × × ×
Italy × × × × × × × ×
Portugal × × × × × × ×
Spain × × × × × × × ×
United
Kingdom
× × × × × ×
Source: Table 4 of International Monetary Fund (October 2012)
also meant:
[W]ithdrawing the state from demand management [. . . ] re-intensifying state
intervention on the side of finance capital, through deregulation, privatization
and de-unionization; weakening social democratic policies, like state provision
of health and welfare benefits, student grants, income supplements and pension
funds and “liberalization” of entire economies, as with open-border trade policies.
(Peet, 2011, 388)
Whether it was simply the ideologically seductive appeal of fiscal responsibility, the over-
bearance of Germany and its myopic devotion to export-led growth for all (Blyth, 2013b),
or simply the most recent thrust in the neoliberal policy agenda is somewhat immaterial.
What matters is that the surprisingly broad policy consensus across Europe resulted in many
countries trying to cut their public spending and / or introducing new taxes at roughly the
same time. In this sense, the 2010 turn towards austerity presents a unique policy experi-
ment for the continent. Coincident with this experiment was the availability and easy access
of detailed distributional data for many European countries, and we take advantage of both
Conversely, Ortiz & Cummins (2013) point out inconsistencies between the IMF’s denouncements of austerity
while giving orthodox pro-cyclical policy advice in the recommendations of specific country reports.
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to provide a baseline analysis of the impact of austerity on the distribution of income across
a panel of European countries.
Past analyses have found that the general distributional impact of fiscal consolidation
made up of these policy changes is unsurprisingly to increase inequality (see the empirical
findings reviewed by Schaltegger & Weder, 2014).3 Consistent with this finding, Zezza (2012)
provides a coherent argument that the turn towards austerity implies a redistribution from
workers to asset owners – from the bottom majority of the distribution to the top minority.
This also connects to post-Keynesian authors like Stockhammer (2013) and Rada & Kiefer
(2015) who have pointed out that a declining wage share can be expected to cause persistent
aggregate demand problems. While we investigate the size distribution of income rather
than the functional distribution, there is a clear way in which our results complement their
arguments.4 Since we are able to discern where exactly the distribution of income is changing,
we might more specifically expect that the positive relationship between fiscal consolidation
and inequality is driven by increasing inequality at the top. We not only find this to be the
case, but also uncover weak evidence that austerity decreases inequality at the bottom.
A tangentially related question is what the effects of such distributional changes might
be on future growth. Neoliberal supporters of austerity argue that increased inequality at
the top would boost the incentives of entrepreneurs, and a reduction in the size of the public
sector means that there are fewer impediments in their way. Mankiw (2013) explicitly makes
the case that greater inequality driven by top incomes increases private incentives and, via
free markets, leads to efficient outcomes, though his case is unrelated to austerity in Europe.
3Schaltegger & Weder (2014) also show that the composition of the government matters and that coalition
governments tend to mitigate the undesirable distributional impact better than either left-leaning or right-
leaning governments.
4Atkinson, Piketty & Saez (2011) also document that inequality has increased thanks to thriving top
income shares across many countries since the late 1970s, while growth overall has remained subdued. The
gains from growth have thus not been shared with large swaths of the population in many developing
countries, while the business cycle has become more volatile as social safety nets have been dismantled.
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It might also seem that Voitchovsky’s (2005) empirical results lend tacit support to this
proposition: she finds that greater inequality at the top is indeed associated with faster
growth over the period 1975 to 2000.
However, the case that there are positive incentive effects to growing inequality rests
on numerous implausible assumptions as Robert Solow (in Solow, Mankiw, Burkhauser &
Larrimore, 2014) points out in his response to Mankiw (2013). And Voitchovsky (2005)
herself suggests that the effects of increased inequality in different parts of the distribution
may have fairly unclear consequences for incentives. She summarizes the literature by point-
ing out that especially inequality at the bottom may have reduced positive incentive effects
because they are offset by worker frustration and feelings of unfairness, and are associated
with negative externalities due to increased anti-social behavior. Inequality at the top as well
may be associated with increased rent-seeking and economic inefficiency (see also Gordon &
Dew-Becker, 2007, Stiglitz, 2012, 2014). Certainly the literature on austerity that has yet to
uncover positive growth effects that might be attributed to either increased “investor confi-
dence” or better private incentives for top income earners, together with our results showing
that austerity in the Eurozone is associated with greater inequality at the top, raises serious
doubts about positive growth effects of increased inequality – at least in post-crisis Europe.
Of course, the austerity experiment saw very different implementation across European
countries, in part reflecting different countries’ fiscal positions. Europe’s largest economy
and export giant, Germany, ran a primary surplus during the later 2000s and was able to
commit to very little austerity. France also resisted many of the more aggressive changes
despite continual (largely unwarranted) bad press about its fiscal position. Smaller countries
considered to be peripheral – like Spain, Ireland, and Greece – found themselves running
large deficits as capital fled back to the core after the financial crisis (Zezza, 2012, Boyer,
2012) and were less able to resist calls for reform. They were thus forced to implement
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much harsher austerity measures.5 The only counterexample to this characterization in our
sample is the United Kingdom, where harsh austerity measures were adopted despite all –
with severe consequences for its economy and population (Ginn, 2013).
Much of this goes beyond the narrower scope of the present work, which only seeks to
investigate the empirical relationship between austerity measures implemented by different
European countries and the observed distributional changes across the entire income distri-
bution. To that effect, we use the JV-indices as complements to the Gini as our measure of
inequality overall and run a panel data analysis for 24 countries from 2005 to 2014, and the
results are suggestive for the discussion above. In the sections that follow, we spell out our
methodology for estimating the JV-indices of inequality from SILC data and our panel esti-
mation strategy. After that, we discuss the results before making some largely speculative
concluding remarks.
2. Method
The method for assessing inequality across the distribution used in this paper was origi-
nally proposed by Jantzen & Volpert (2012) and used recently by Schneider & Tavani (2015).
It is based on the observation of approximate self-similarity in both the left and right tails of
the observed income distribution. Self-similarity refers to the repeating pattern of inequality
in subsequently smaller and smaller quantiles of either tail. For example, in the US about
half of all income goes to the top decile of income earners, but the top 1 percent get about
half of the top decile’s share (so about a quarter of total income). Approximately half of
what is going to the top 1 percent goes to the top 0.1%, and half of that appears to go to the
top 0.01% (see Piketty & Saez, 2006). This pattern is called right self-similarity and reflects
5Kinsella (2012) provides an illustrative analysis of Ireland, showing that neither the recent experience or
in the experience of the 1980s should justify holding it up as a poster-child of expansionary fiscal consolidation.
A case bolstered by Perotti (2012).
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power-law behavior in the upper tail of the distribution. The degree of inequality associated
with the repeating pattern is reflected in the share of income going to the top percentile: do
the top 1 percent capture half or only 40% of the share of income going to the top decile?
Jantzen & Volpert (2012) note a similar pattern of self-replication at the bottom (left)
end of the distribution. They observe that in the US the bottom two quintiles together
appear to be getting about a quarter of the share of income going to the bottom 80% of
income earners. The bottom quintile however receives roughly a quarter of what the bottom
40% capture, and the bottom decile gets roughly a quarter of the bottom quintile’s share.
This suggests that the observed distribution is also at least approximately left self-similar.
Based on these observations, Jantzen & Volpert (2012) propose a parametric Lorenz
curve model that features asymptotic right and left self-similarity towards the extremes of
the upper and lower tails respectively (their “hybrid model” is among the family of Lorenz
curve models discussed by Sarabia, Castillo & Slottje, 1999). Based on the parameters of
this model, the authors propose two indices that capture the degree of inequality in the
upper and lower tails of the distribution, G1 and G0 respectively. Specifically, G1 is higher
if the top 1 percent get half rather than only 40% of the top decile’s income share – or the
fatter the power-law tail gets. Similarly, G0 is greater if the bottom decile gets a smaller
portion of the bottom quintile’s income share. With a minor modification to G0 proposed in
Schneider & Tavani (2015), both JV-indices are Gini-like in the sense that they are based on
the Lorenz curve and take values between 0 and 1. However, G1 and G0 do not represent a
decomposition of the Gini coefficient in that it is not possible to recover the overall Gini as
a linear combination of the JV-indices. In fact, the Gini coefficient is relatively insensitive
to the distributional changes captured by either of these two indices.
The fact that our chosen approach is based on fitting a parametric Lorenz curve to
the data directly has several appealing features. Given data on income shares captured by
different population percentiles, this procedure is (a) easier than modified approximations for
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the Gini or other inequality indices, and (b) more parsimonious than the common practice of
fitting a very general parametric distribution to raw or binned data (see Jenkins, 2009, for an
example). Whether one uses the JV-indices, entropy-based indices, or income shares should
ultimately be unimportant as long as an appropriate set of indices is used to differentiate
between distributional changes at the bottom or at the top. We appreciate, for example,
that Voitchovsky (2005) characterizes the “profile” of the income distribution using three
ratios – 90/10, 50/10, and 90/50 – to capture exactly these kinds of differences. We believe
our method is superior because it takes much more information about the very extremes
of the upper and lower tails into account. After all, the main insight brought to light by
Piketty & Saez (2003, 2006) and Atkinson et al. (2011) is that most of the action in terms
of recent distributional changes is happening within the top decile!
2.1. JV Indices of Inequality
The two-parameter Lorenz curve model proposed by Jantzen & Volpert (2012) is given
by equation (1), where p and q are the parameters of the model and x is the cumulative
population share whose share of all income is L(x; p, q). According to Sarabia et al. (1999),
Jantzen & Volpert (2012), Schneider & Tavani (2015) and our own findings, this model fits
observed income distributions very well for a number of countries.
L(x; p, q) = xp (1− (1− x)q) (1)
The Gini coefficient, G, as well as the JV-indices, G0 and G1, can be calculated from the
estimated parameters according to equations (2), (3), and (4) respectively. As noted above,
the JV-indices are based on the degree of inequality in the asymptotically self-similar right
and left tails of the distribution. Note that G1 is strictly decreasing in q (consistent with
a smaller exponent of the implied asymptotic power-law suggesting a fatter tail and thus
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greater inequality) while G0 is a strictly increasing function of p.
G = 1− 2
p+ 1
+ 2
Γ(p+ 1)Γ(q + 1)
Γ(p+ q + 2)
(2)
G0 =
3p
p+ 2
(3)
G1 =
1− q
1 + q
(4)
The parameters p and q in equation (1) were estimated using Stata’s nl estimation
command, and the inequality indices appearing as the dependent variables in our panel
estimations were calculated according to the equations above.6
2.2. Illustrative Examples
To make the kind of analysis that looking at the JV-measures of inequality at the bottom
and top more concrete, we would like to highlight some specific country-cases. Given that
our follow-up analysis is on the distributional impacts of austerity, it makes sense to pick
countries that highlight the implementation of spending cuts in the name of deficit reduction
and future growth, so we will use Spain and Greece as illustrative examples. Our guiding
principal for these comparison are the social welfare implications of distributional changes
as outlined by Atkinson (1970) and generalized to take into account growth by Shorrocks
(1983). What Atkinson (1970) showed is that if income is redistributed so that the new
Lorenz curve lies strictly above the old one while average income per capita remained the
same, then there would be a social welfare gain for any strictly concave social welfare function
regardless of the implied degree of inequality aversion.
6Raw parameter estimates and standard errors are available from the authors upon request.
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Thanks to Sarabia et al. (1999), this can be translated into dominance conditions of the
estimated parameters in model (1). Specifically if we let ∆p = p2 − p1 and ∆q = q2 − q1,
then:
L(x; p1, q1) ≥ L(x; p2, q2) if and only if ∆p∆q ≤ 0 and ∆p > 0 or ∆q < 0 or both (5)
But this leaves out the consideration of compensating growth taken up by Dollar, Kleineberg
& Kraay (2015), which is were the generalized Lorenz curve due to Shorrocks (1983) is very
helpful. By rescaling the vertical axis to GDP per capita, the generalization allows us to
use Lorenz curve comparisons when there were both distributional changes and growth. The
underlying logic regarding welfare implications remains the same: if the new generalized
Lorenz curve lies strictly above the old one, there was an unambiguous welfare gain – either
due to growth or distributional changes or both.
Looking at Spain in 2008 compared to 2011 gives us an illustrative picture. In Figure
1, the right frame shows the Lorenz curve and it is discernible that the distribution in 2008
strictly dominates that of 2011, which is likely to be the result of “reforms to ease firing
and lay-offs, curb severance pay and limit collective bargaining rights” (Ortiz & Cummins,
2013, p. 16). In addition, the economy contracted so that the generalized Lorenz curve for
2011 (left frame) also lies strictly below that of 2008. We can therefore claim that between
2008 and 2011, Spain’s population experienced an unambiguous welfare loss due to both
distributional changes and the contraction of the economy. Furthermore, our analysis shows
that the distributional changes were driven by an increase in inequality at the bottom of the
distribution.
By comparison, the distributional changes in Greece between 2008 and 2012 are somewhat
ambiguous: there was rising inequality at the bottom, but a reduction in inequality at the top
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Figure 1: Changes in the Lorenz curve (right) and generalized Lorenz curve (left) for Spain, 2008 to 2011
(see Figure 2). No clear assessment of the welfare implications of the distributional changes
alone is possible. However, the economic contraction in Greece was much more dramatic so
that the generalized Lorenz curve for 2012 lies far below that of 2008.
The Lorenz and generalized Lorenz curves for Ireland or Germany (not shown), provide
interesting contrasts to those for Spain and Greece. Between 2008 and 2012, Ireland saw
no notable distributional changes (mild increase in G0 and a small decrease in G1) and very
little change in GDP per capita (still below 2008, but not far). In Germany, the distribution
of income had changed little, but there was relatively strong growth, so that the generalized
Lorenz curve for 2012 was everywhere above that of 2008. Instead of continuing country
by country through their specific experiences in terms of distributional changes and growth
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Figure 2: Changes in the Lorenz curve (right) and generalized Lorenz curve (left) for Greece, 2008 to 2012
patterns, we propose a simple statistical analysis to see if there are broader patterns of how
austerity affected the distribution of income in different countries.
2.3. Analysis of Distributional Effects of Austerity
As an application of why looking at distributional changes across the whole distribution
– or the profile of inequality, as Voitchovsky (2005) put it – we look at changes in the
cyclically adjusted fiscal positions of European countries and the effect of those changes on
our distribution measures. We have a panel of 24 countries over 9 years for which we have
estimates of our inequality measures and each country’s fiscal position. As before, we control
for distributional changes that result from faster or slower growth. Fourteen of the countries
in our sample use the euro (AC) as their currency, while the rest retain their own currencies.
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Kinsella (2012) makes the salient point that fiscal consolidation in Ireland in the 1980s did
not have the same deleterious effects on the economy as austerity recently, in part because
Ireland’s trade partners were growing and thanks to the devaluation of its currency. Neither
channel was open to help offset austerity to any country relying on trade within Europe
and on the euro in 2010. Hence, we control for Eurozone membership using a dummy and
also export performance (measured as the growth in exports compared to the growth in the
relevant export markets).
Putting everything together, we perform a relatively straightforward panel data analysis
that regresses the percent change in the inequality index, ∆G, against the percent change in
a country’s fiscal position, ∆F , while taking into account said controls, as shown in equation
(6). Use of the euro is captured by DAC while X and g control for export performance and
growth respectively (they appear as lagged terms to avoid endogeneity). Estimations also
control for country and time fixed effects using country- and year-dummies (not shown in
results).
∆Git = αi + µt + β1 ∆Fi t + β2 gi t−1 + β3Xi t−1 + β4DACi t + ui t (6)
The basic model is modified to take into account interactions between the Eurozone
dummy and ∆F , and to allow for lagged effects of ∆F on the distribution. Given the
sufficient length of the panel, we use Prais-Winsten estimation assuming panel-specific au-
tocorrelated errors as suggested by Greene (2008), Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2012). The
fact that the dependent variables are themselves estimates should not bias our coefficient
estimates, but may be responsible for slightly inflated standard errors.
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3. Data
Data for the income shares used to estimate the underlying Lorenz curve model comes
from the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) database. We calculated pre-
tax income shares for the bottom 4%, bottom 5%, every decile, the 1st and 3rd quartiles,
and the bottom 95%, 96%, 98%, and 99% of households for every country. This gives us 18
coordinates to which we fit the Lorenz curve model (compared to 7 or 8 used in Schneider
et al., 2015). The resulting fit is exceptional for all countries and years, with reported values
of R2 exceeding 0.999 in all cases.
We take a very standard approach and use the change in cyclically adjusted primary
balance (CAPB) as our primary proxy for austerity. Estimates for CAPB come from the
IMF Fiscal Monitor dataset.7 Guajardo et al. (2014) have made a compelling case that
CAPB is an imperfect measure of austerity at best and is quite likely to result in an under-
estimation of the contractionary effects. We hope, however, that recent adjustments made
by the IMF to exclude one-time spending (e.g., in Ireland in 2010 in support of its banking
sector) and the fact that we are looking at the distributional effects mitigates some of the
worst biases of using this measure. As a complement, we offer an analysis that uses changes
in the OECD’s estimates for cyclically adjusted current distributions net of interest payment
(CACD) and cyclically adjusted current revenue (CACR) instead of CAPB. The data for
CACD, CACR, and export performance comes from the OECD Economic Outlook no. 98
released November, 2015. While looking at spending and revenue separately does not resolve
the issues with CAPB, it does allow us to comment on which side of fiscal policy appears to
be driving the distributional changes.
As a way of comparing the different data sources for consistency, we show a comparison
between the IMF Fiscal Monitor 2014 CAPB estimates versus the 2015 estimates, and the
7The only exception is Estonia, for which there is no CAPB estimate in the IMF database. We use the
OECD CAPB estimate for Estonia instead.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. Notes
Gini Coefficient 28.7 (3.69) 22.4 38.1 Lorenz curve model applied
to SILC data
G0 40.3 (9.04) 13.20 66.0 Lorenz curve model applied
to SILC data
G1 18.45 (3.04) 12.86 26.7 Lorenz curve model applied
to SILC data
Growth Rate (%) 1.235 (3.42) -14.26 10.49 OECD data
CAPB -1.41 (3.43) -13.23 4.72 Cyclically adjusted primary
balance; IMF FM data
CACD 42.2 (5.14) 32.0 53.0 Cyclically adjusted current
disbursements (w/out inter-
est payments); OECD data
CACR 43.6 (5.67) 32.5 58.4 Cyclically adjusted current
revenue; OECD data
Export Performance 0.036 (4.10) -12.79 21.5 Export growth relative to
the growth in the relevant
export markets; OECD data
euro 0.64 – 0 1 Dummy indicating use of AC
or not
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IMF CAPB estimate versus the difference between CACR and CACD in Figure 3. Clearly,
the new and old CAPB estimates agree very well, and OECD and IMF data agree reasonably
well as cyclically adjusted deficit proxies. There is some discrepancy is between CAPB and
(CACR - CACD), which makes sense because the 2015 IMF estimates take extraordinary care
to drop one-time expenditures that are likely to still be included in the OECD estimates.8
Figure 3: Comparing the 2014 and 2015 IMF CAPB data, and changes in CAPB vs. changes in OECD
revenue minus spending estimates
A visual comparison of the estimated Gini and the JV-indices presented in Schneider
8The OECD also provides CAPB estimates, though these can deviate significantly from the IMF estimates.
For example, the IMF estimates CAPB for Ireland in 2010 at -6.50% of potential GDP, while OECD puts
the same data point at -25.19%. The difference appears to be one time banking sector support that the
OECD includes but the IMF does not (International Monetary Fund, October 2015b).
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et al. (2015) and our revised estimates is shown in Figures 4 and 5. The new estimates
of the JV-indices match the old estimates well, while estimated Gini coefficient is basically
unaltered. It is not surprising that the estimates of G0 and G1 have changed somewhat
given the additional data density in the crucial tail regions underlying their estimation. The
overall correspondence between old and new estimates, however, gives us confidence that our
original results were qualitatively correct. We explore the effect of the new data and new
inequality estimates on the previous results explicitly in the Results section of this paper.
Figure 4: Comparing the old and new estimated Gini coefficients
A final note of warning is that CAPB, CACD, and CACR estimates are all expressed as
percentages of potential GDP, which itself is an estimate based on filtered historical trends.
As the crisis in many European countries is prolonged, statistical agencies are prone to
making backwards revisions of their potential GDP estimates. Unfortunately, using these
measures of countries’ fiscal position for an analysis like ours makes the results sensitive to
such revisions. We cannot rule out that even the switch from the slightly older IMF estimates
used in our earlier work to the more up-to-date estimates might result in weakened results,
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Figure 5: Comparing the old and new estimates of the JV-indices
but the side-by-side comparison of the estimates presented in Schneider et al. (2015) and
the same analysis using the new data (see Appendix A) reveals no important changes in the
results. A more proper comparison to a historical dataset like the one constructed and used
by Guajardo et al. (2014) would shed light on how sensitive our findings are to the choice of
fiscal measures, but we currently do not have access to the appropriate data.
Another important improvement is the expanded list of countries for which this income
data has become available. There are now 24 countries in our sample, which are listed in
Table 4. Many of these countries saw a sharp increase in their cyclically adjusted primary
deficit (increasingly negative CAPB) in the wake of the financial crisis as the result of sudden
capital flight. Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland received most of the attention from
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the press and european policy-makers, but this pattern is also seen in Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom.9 It is this
wide-spread increase in deficits that led to panic among policy-makers and the strong push
for austerity in 2009.
Table 4: Countries
Country Gini in 2007 CAPB in 2007 Debt in 2007 Currency
Austria 26.1 -0.99 64.8 AC
Belgium 26.2 2.40 86.8 AC
Czech Republic 25.2 -2.24 27.8 koruna
Denmark 25.2 3.88 27.3 Danish krone
Estonia 33.4 -5.01 3.7 AC
Finland 26.1 1.71 34.0 AC
France 26.6 -1.12 64.2 AC
Germany 30.3 1.62 63.8 AC
Greece 34.4 -5.37 102.8 AC
Hungary 25.6 -3.55 65.8 forint
Iceland 27.9 3.08 27.3 kro´na
Ireland 31.2 -9.18 23.9 AC
Italy 31.9 1.68 99.7 AC
Latvia 35.5 -0.78 7.2 AC
Lithuania 34.0 -0.47 16.7 AC
Luxembourg 27.5 0.98 7.0 AC
Netherlands 27.6 1.21 45.3 AC
Norway 23.6 -7.27 49.2 Norwegian krone
Poland 32.2 -0.26 44.6 z loty
Portugal 36.9 -1.56 68.4 AC
Slovenia 23.3 -1.43 22.7 AC
Spain 32.0 1.58 35.5 AC
Sweden 23.4 2.09 38.1 Swedish krona
United Kingdom 32.7 -3.70 43.6 £
Other countries in our sample do not follow this pattern. Sweden, for example, saw an
increase in its primary surplus leading up to 2009 and Hungary aggressively decreased its
primary deficit to end up with a small surplus by 2009. Austria, the Czech Republic, and
9Unfortunately OECD CACD and CACR estimates are not available for Latvia and Lithuania, so that
they are not included in the regressions featuring a separation of spending and revenue adjustments.
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Italy saw no notable deficit increase prior to 2009, although all three countries made strong
moves towards surpluses post-2009. It turns out, while the impetus and push for austerity
was wide-spread, it was not universal across Europe, thus providing a useful amount of
variation for our panel analysis.
4. Results
In the section that follows we present the main results of our panel data analysis. First,
we briefly explore the statistical relationship between growth and austerity suggested by
our dataset. Second, we show the results using the full set of countries and the expanded
analysis window. An interesting new finding is that the relationship between austerity as
measured by changes in CAPB and overall inequality weakens, while we recover a new
significant relationship between changes in the distribution towards the extremes and changes
in cyclically adjusted revenue.
4.1. Growth & Austerity
We want to briefly explore the strong negative correlation between growth and austerity
found in our sample of countries. Listed in Table 5 are the results of some simple panel
regressions. Even (A), a simple OLS regression with clustered errors and no fixed effects,
suggests a statistically significant negative relationship between austerity and growth. (B)
is also a OLS regression but controls for fixed effects. (C) and (D) are Prais-Winston
regressions assuming panel autocorrelated errors. Regardless of estimation technique, the
negative relationship persists and is highly significant.
The results presented in Table 5 are hardly surprising the numerous analyses that have
found similar results. For example, researchers at the IMF found that the multipliers implic-
itly assumed by proponents of expansionary fiscal consolidation were too small (Blanchard
& Leigh, 2013) in part because they depend significantly on the state of the economy (Baum,
22
Table 5: Panel Regression Results: Growth & Austerity
(A) (B) (C) (D)
∆CAPB -0.26* -0.35** -0.34*** -0.35***
(0.135) (0.163) (0.084) (0.085)
AC -0.76 -0.157 -0.114 —
(0.45) (0.112) (0.81) —
Exp. Perf. 0.027 0.161*** 0.176*** 0.21***
(0.043) (0.039) (0.055) (0.035)
AC×Exp.
Perf.
0.36*** 0.081 0.081 —
(0.138) (0.085) (0.078) —
Constant 1.17*** 11.6*** 10.6*** 10.3***
(0.36) (0.31) (2.9) (3.1)
R2 0.147 0.78 0.80 0.80
Cntry.
FEs
No Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Year FEs No Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.02; standard errors in
parenthesis; N = 177
Poplawski-Ribeiro & Weber, 2012), implying that the contractionary effects were understated
and the expansionary effects overemphasized in the case for austerity. Despite being critical
of the IMF’s cyclical adjustments, Perotti (2012) also concedes that austerity in Europe af-
ter the financial crisis was likely to be contractionary echoing Kinsella (2012) on the role of
currency adjustments10 and Eggertsson & Krugman (2012) regarding the limited room for
interest rate adjustments (see also Botta, 2016, for a recent discussion of the theoretical and
empirical sides of this debate). Given the pro-growth bias of changes in CAPB documented
by Guajardo et al. (2014), our results may even understate the negative effects. We now
proceed to the analysis of how austerity has impacted the profile of inequality across the
countries in our data.
10What is surprising given this literature is that the correlation between growth and austerity does not
seem to be conditional on a country’s use of the AC.
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4.2. Expanded Results
We now estimate the comprehensive model to assess the relationship between austerity
and inequality that not only controls for Eurozone membership and export performance,
but also includes interaction terms between the Eurozone dummy and changes in CAPB (or
changes in CACD and CACR when these replace CAPB). We also include lagged change
terms that appear to be of statistical significance for some specifications. Where they are,
they tend to indicate that the distributional effects of changes in CAPB (or CACD and
CACR) are short-lived. The estimated coefficients based on the full model are listed in
Table 6.
Note that the inclusion of export performance has resulted in the link between past-period
growth and changes in the Gini disappearing. Growth now appears to only have a weak
correlation with inequality at the bottom, where faster growth is associated with reduced
inequality. One could argue that the weak correlation between inequality and growth is
consistent with Dollar, Kleineberg & Kraay (2015), while the negative association between
inequality at the bottom and past growth is consistent in terms of direction with Voitchovsky
(2005). However, our model indicates that causation runs from growth to inequality: faster
growth leads to reduction in inequality at the bottom, not the other way around.
Past export performance appears to have a very strong relationship with distributional
changes. Notably, strong export performance is associated with a rise in inequality at the
bottom and reduced inequality at the top. Given that export sectors tend to be concentrated
in manufacturing and services associated with tourism, it is not surprising that better export
performance would differentially boost incomes at the lower end of the distribution. The
finding that the effect at the top of the income distribution goes in the other direction
remains to be explained.
Since we are primarily interested in the marginal effect of changes in CAPB, CACD, and
CACR on our different measures of inequality, we show our estimates for them in Table 7.
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Table 6: Panel Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Gini G0 G1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AC -0.25 1.41 2.04 4.37** 3.52 1.45
(1.20) (1.75) (2.53) (2.12) (3.90) (4.36)
∆CAPBt -0.43*** — -0.66*** — -0.094 —
(0.13) (0.20) (0.24)
∆CAPBt−1 -0.34*** — 0.32* — -0.65*** —
(0.14) (0.18) (0.22)
AC×∆CAPBt 0.77*** — 0.65*** — 0.48 —
(0.18) (0.26) (0.37)
AC×∆CAPBt−1 0.49*** — -0.42 — 1.00*** —
(0.21) (0.30) (0.41)
∆CACDt — 1.23*** — 2.26*** — -0.37
(0.52) (0.80) (1.26)
∆CACDt−1 — 0.58 — -3.73*** — 3.02***
(0.56) (0.81) (1.26)
AC×∆CACDt — -1.97*** — -1.57* — -1.20
(0.51) (0.82) (1.31)
AC×∆CACDt−1 — -0.41 — 3.19*** — -2.37*
(0.52) (0.91) (1.23)
∆CACRt — -1.98*** — 0.54 — -3.61***
(0.41) (0.56) (0.91)
∆CACRt−1 — -0.34 — -0.37 — 0.14
(0.47) (0.65) (1.06)
AC×∆CACRt — 1.99*** — 0.16 — 2.73**
(0.55) (0.55) (1.21)
AC×∆CACRt−1 — -0.051 — 0.00046 — -0.50
(0.57) (0.62) (1.24)
gt−1 0.098 -0.034 -0.56* -0.50** 0.50 0.23
(0.14) (0.16) (0.30) (0.23) (0.35) (0.40)
Exportst−1 -0.22*** -0.23*** 0.62*** 0.66*** -0.65*** -0.69***
(0.082) (0.075) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16)
Constant 1.35 -2.33 -7.41 0.64 -1.91 -6.68*
(4.51) (1.56) (9.13) (2.14) (14.0) (3.84)
R2 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.28
N 155 175 155 175 155 175
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.02; standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 7: Marginal Effects Summary
∆CAPB ∆CACD ∆CACR
t t− 1 t t− 1 t t− 1
Eurozone Countries
Gini 0.34*** 0.155 -0.74*** 0.168 0.0155 -0.39
G0 -0.167 -0.102 0.69* -0.55 0.70 -0.37
G1 0.38 0.35 -1.57*** 0.65 -0.88 -0.36
Other Countries
Gini -0.43*** -0.34*** 1.23*** 0.58 -1.98*** -0.34
G0 -0.66*** 0.32* 2.3*** -3.7*** 0.54 -0.37
G1 -0.094 -0.65*** -0.37 3.0*** -3.6*** 0.139
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.02
Concentrating on the statistically significant marginal effects, we find that across Eurozone
countries spending cuts (decreases in CACD) increased overall inequality. Specifically, they
were associated with decreased inequality at the bottom as measured byG0, but that decrease
was more than offset by increased inequality at the top as measured by G1. Some of these
effects appeared to fade quickly as indicated by the reversal in sign on the lagged change
in current distributions (never statistically significant). Also not significant – but largely
complimentary in signs – were the distributional effects of revenue increases. A positive
change in current revenue was associated with higher inequality at the bottom and overall,
but lower inequality in every measure next period.
The effects of changes in spending and revenue are very different for the countries not
in the Eurozone. Here, the effect of spending cuts on inequality at the bottom appears to
trump the inequality increasing effect at the top to produce a statistically significant overall
reduction in the Gini. The offsetting next-period effects on both G0 and G1 are statistically
significant, so that the next-period effect on overall inequality is likely muted. Revenue
increases have statistically more distinct effect on top incomes and even the effect on overall
inequality is significant.
These results are broadly consistent with Schneider et al. (2015): a policy turn towards
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austerity appears to drive up overall inequality among Eurozone countries via greater in-
equality among high incomes. We see in addition that this is driven primarily by changes in
public expenditures. Among countries not using the euro as their currency, austerity tends to
reduce inequality, though that reduction is driven by reduced inequality among low incomes;
a finding that is directionally consistent with the findings for the Eurozone countries. While
changes in current expenditures are important across country groups, changes in current
revenue only have statistically significant effect for non-Eurozone countries. Raising more
revenue appear to reduce inequality at the top and thus inequality overall.
To get some feel for the context of our results, it is illustrative to look at the average
changes in spending and revenue. Both countries on the euro and countries maintaining their
own currency sharply cut spending on average after 2010, as indicated by the steep decline in
CACD in both panels of Figure 6. The difference is that Eurozone countries had maintained
fairly constant spending levels prior to 2008 interrupted by a rise in CACD between 2008
to 2009 that indicates a fiscal response to the unfolding financial crisis. By contrast, the
non-Eurozone countries had been ratcheting up spending for a number of years before and
through the crisis. Moreover, they also maintained steady revenue growth, so that deficits
did not explode as they did for the Eurozone.
The left panel of Figure 6 shows the collapse in revenues across the Eurozone as a result
of the financial crisis. As Guajardo et al. (2014) have pointed out, cyclical adjustments are
generally imperfect and in particular do not capture revenue collapse due to a sharp drop
in asset prices and the subsequent loss of capital gains taxes. The sharp decline in CACR
prior to the rise in CACD – and the modest magnitude and short duration of the latter –
supports the conclusion drawn by Zezza (2012) and Boyer (2012) that the rapid rise in deficits
across much of Europe was the symptom of the financial crisis and not profligate spending.
Nonetheless, Figure 6 clearly shows all countries on average cutting spending and increasing
revenue to fight structural deficits starting in 2010. In addition to the contractionary effects
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on the European economy overall, we document that this is likely to have reduced inequality
at the bottom of the distribution of income in each country and sharply increased inequality
at the top in the Eurozone.
For non-Eurozone countries, we find evidence that austerity reduced inequality on the
whole for two reasons. The decrease in inequality at the bottom appears to dominate and
we find no evidence (the coefficient estimate is near zero) for an increase in inequality at
the top. Part of the story also appears to be the accelerated rise in CACR seen in the right
panel of Figure 6. The panel regression results shown in Table 7 indicate that for countries
not on the euro, changes in CACR played a big role in reducing inequality at the top.
Figure 6: Eurozone and non-Eurozone Spending & Revenue
Obviously, these are broad generalities and do not speak to the particular policy changes
in each country. The distributional effects we are trying to characterize are very likely to be
sensitive to what programs are cut or how additional revenue is raised. In that sense, the
amount of residual variation that makes many of our estimates not appear significant is not
surprising.
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5. Discussion
We return to Voitchovsky (2005) who argued it is “the profile of inequality” that matters
for the future performance of an economy. In this paper, we presented two additional indices
that help assess changes in the profile of inequality by capturing inequality at the top and
bottom of the income distribution separately. The JV-indices (along with the Gini coefficient)
were estimated for 24 European countries over 9 years covering the policy turn toward
austerity.
For the Eurozone, we find an exacerbated effect of austerity on inequality as countries
implemented spending cuts that effectively reduced inequality at the bottom while increasing
it at the top. Other European Union countries that maintained their independent currencies
were more able to deflate without cutting wages as sharply, partially explaining why they
saw a reduction in income inequality. While we have uncovered new correlative relation-
ships between austerity and distributional changes, adding significant nuance to the existing
literature, further work is warranted to explore the exact causal pathways between con-
tractionary fiscal policy post-crisis and rising inequality. A systematic country-by-country
comparison of changes in the profile of inequality brought out by the JV-indices to detailed
information about policy changes and their timing provided by the IMF country reports, for
example, would shed a lot more light on how specific implementations of austerity affected
the distribution of income.
To speculate a little, inequality does represent an incentive structure of some sort, though
care must be take to understand what behavior is being incentivized. In so far as income
from work (labor) dominates the bottom of the distribution, inequality at the bottom is
perhaps most associated with increasing rewards for productive work. High inequality at
the bottom implies that local moves up yield relatively big rewards in terms of extra share in
total income going to the household able to make such a move, and local moves (e.g., between
adjacent quintiles) tend to be most common. But higher inequality at the bottom also means
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that those left behind receive a smaller share of total income, and whether that is socially
acceptable depends on the effectiveness and cost of the social safety net for protecting the
most vulnerable. In the age of austerity, it is of course exactly the social safety net that has
been the prime target of spending cuts.
Conversely, a lack of inequality at the bottom means that the vast majority of households
have no real incentives to move up, because increases in productivity through education,
training, or hard work reap only small additional rewards. In a time of lackluster growth
– or explicit contraction for many European countries – lower inequality at the bottom
probably means a broadly-shared loss of resources and deterioration of incentives. Following
public sentiment in Europe, it does seem that it is austerity leading to reduced inequality
at the bottom and a weakened safety net that explains the popular dissatisfaction that is
shaping politics.
By contrast, inequality at the top reflects an incentive structure that applies only to
a small elite of income earners. If suspicions are born out that a substantial portion of
these incomes reflect rent-seeking, then more inequality at the top actually implies increased
incentives to misbehave (Stiglitz, 2012, 2014). The combination of stagnation and a falling
wage share, together with low inequality at the bottom while inequality at the top is rising,
surely presents worrisome implications.
If the policy agenda behind austerity is motivated by tapping the potential of markets
to ensure efficiency, then the desired result should be to increase inequality at the bottom
– while providing due safeguards for the very bottom – and limiting inequality at the top
to deincentivize rent-seeking. Our results imply the opposite: that on average austerity
reduced the incentives for most workers while only the incentives for the elite at the very
top increased.
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Appendix A. Replication of Previous Results
Repeating the analysis presented in Schneider et al. (2015), using the new estimates for
the inequality measures and using the updated CAPB estimates, results in comparable point
estimates for the coefficients (see Table A.8). Standard error estimates, however, turned out
to be slightly larger on average, though this does not affect the statistically significance of
any of the estimates. Note that past growth appears to have a robust inequality-reducing
effect by specifically driving down inequality at the bottom. For the panel covering the sub-
set of 12 Eurozone countries used in the initial study, changes in CAPB are associated with
increased inequality driven by increased inequality at the top (note large positive coefficient
on ∆CAPB for ∆G1). Just as in Schneider et al. (2015), the coefficients on ∆CAPB for the
∆G0 regressions are negative, but not significant. We update the estimation technique to
Prais-Winston with panel-specific autocorrelated errors and include export performance as
an additional control. The “PW OLS” columns in Table A.8 show that neither changed the
qualitative result for the original panel of countries, although some coefficients appear more
significant and R2 was higher.
Table A.8: Panel Regression Results: Replication of Original Results
Dependent
Variable:
∆ Gini ∆G0 ∆G1
Old New PW OLS Old New PW OLS Old New PW OLS
∆CAPB 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.50*** -0.44 -0.33 -0.36 1.10*** 0.81* 0.96***
(0.097) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.35) (0.26) (0.35) (0.42) (0.36)
Growth -0.24* -0.26* -0.27** -0.91** -0.75*** -0.83*** 0.132 0.16 0.16
(0.108) (0.13) (0.13) (0.31) (0.26) (0.29) (0.38) (0.35) (0.36)
Exp. Perf. – – -0.018 – – 0.41* – – -0.18
(0.096) (0.21) (0.25)
Constant 3.4* 2.56 2.71*** 9.9*** 5.36* 6.15*** 0.30 -0.059 0.020
(1.85) (1.63) (0.86) (2.7) (2.90) (1.90) (4.7) (3.96) (2.08)
R2 0.18 0.21 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.18 0.27
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.02; standard errors in parenthesis; N = 84
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